Das erste Angebot in Vertragsverhandlungen: Ankerwirkung und strategische Implikationen

We are delighted to share that our new article „Das erste Angebot in Vertragsverhandlungen: Ankerwirkung und strategische Implikationen“ has just been published in ZKM – Zeitschrift für Konfliktmanagement (Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt).

Together with my co-authors Peter Kesting (Aarhus University) and Wolfram Lipp (Hochschule Landshut), we explore one of the most critical, yet often underestimated, moments in negotiations: the first offer.

Research consistently shows that first offers exert a powerful anchoring effect, shaping not only the direction of the discussion but also the final outcome. Our article examines:

  • Why the first offer matters so much in both economic and legal contexts
  • When it is wise to make the first move – and when strategic restraint pays off
  • How counteroffers can function as a “second anchor” with their own powerful effects
  • Why asking for the “best price” can be a surprisingly effective negotiation tactic
  • How the tension between cooperation and anchoring plays out in real-world negotiations

The article offers both psychological insights and practical guidance for anyone involved in complex contract negotiations, whether in business, law, or public settings.

Full article available in ZKM via Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt.